

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05
PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 ACDA-07 IO-13 SAJ-01
TRSE-00 OMB-01 OES-06 EB-07 ERDA-05 ISO-00 /098 W
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R 091742Z DEC 76

FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3983
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
CINC EUR VAIHINGEN
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY ROME

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 20746

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR, CSCE, GW

SUBJECT: WILLY BRANDT ON MBFR, CSCE, THE BREZHNEV

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VISIT, BERLIN AND NON-FIRST-USE

REF: BONN 19491 DTG 181649Z NOV 76(NOTAL)

BEGIN SUMMARY: IN AN INTERVIEW WITH A LOCAL NEWSPAPER, SPD CHAIRMAN WILLY BRANDT CALLED FOR SOME FIRST CONCRETE STEPS FOR TROOP REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. HE ALSO ECHOED THE BREZHNEV LINE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THE GREAT PROBLEMS OF ENERGY, TRANSPORTATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT. BRANDT EMPHASIZED THE GERMANS WOULD NOT GO IT ALONE ON THESE QUESTIONS BUT WOULD CONSULT WITH THEIR EUROPEAN PARTNERS AND NATO ALLIES. END SUMMARY.

1. IN THE DECEMBER 9 EDITION OF BONN'S "GENERAL ANZEIGER" WILLY BRANDT GAVE AN INTERVIEW TO REPORTER WOLF J. BELL IN WHICH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPD COMMENTED ABOUT MBFR, CSCE, THE BREZHNEV VISIT, BERLIN AND NON-FIRST-USE.
2. AN INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF THOSE SECTIONS OF THE INTERVIEW WHICH PERTAIN TO MBFR, CSCE AND THE BREZHNEV VISIT FOLLOW.

QUESTION: DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ARE COMING TO THE FOREFRONT IN THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE. WHAT PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE IN THIS FIELD?

BRANDT: WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON TROOP REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD BE FREED FROM THE STAGNATING EXPERT DISCUSSIONS AND ELEVATED TO A HIGH POLITICAL LEVEL. ADDITIONALLY, I DO NOT CONSIDER IT ESPECIALLY FORTUNATE THAT THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS WERE LEFT SO LONG TO THE EXPERTS NO MATTER HOW GOOD THEY MAY HAVE BEEN. AS A RESULT, MORE HAS BEEN PACKED INTO THE INDIVIDUAL BASKETS THAN WAS JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF THE DIFFERENT POLITICAL SYSTEMS; THIS HAS INDUCED GREAT HOPES WITH REGARD TO THE RESULTS. ONE SHOULD AVOID MAKING A SIMILAR ERROR IN MBFR. NATURALLY, PROGRESS WILL ONLY BE POSSIBLE HERE WHEN THE AMERICAN-SOVIET SALT II NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS HAVE LED TO A RESULT. THAT

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WILL PROBABLY HAPPEN NEXT YEAR. THEN ONE CAN PAUSE IN MBFR AND THE RESPONSIBLE POLITICIANS CAN CONSIDER CONCRETELY HOW IT SHOULD PROCEED.

QUESTION: IS PROGRESS AT ALL THINKABLE SO LONG AS MOSCOW DOES NOT ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF THE BALANCE OF ARMS IN CENTRAL EUROPE?

BRANDT: THE SOVIET UNION HAS NEVER TURNED ASIDE FROM THE CONCEPT OF BALANCE. BUT I REMEMBER THAT DURING MY DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. BREZHNEV IN OREANDA A FORMULA WAS FOUND WHICH PERMITTED ONE TO EXPRESS IT DIFFERENTLY; NAMELY, THAT THE INTERESTS NEITHER OF ONE NOR THE OTHER SIDE SHOULD BE PREJUDICED. THE GOAL OF DETENTE POLICY IN THIS AREA MUST BE, FIRST OF ALL, TO BRING ABOUT, STEP BY STEP, A CONDITION IN WHICH A MILITARY ATTACK IN CENTRAL EUROPE FROM A STANDING START BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE. THAT WILL CERTAINLY REQUIRE SOME TIME, BUT ONE SHOULD AT LEAST BEGIN WITH TWO PRINCIPAL IMPORTANT STEPS: NAMELY, WITH A FIRST -- IF ONLY SYMBOLIC -- LIMITATION OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET FORCES WITHIN THE AGREED GEOGRAPHICAL AREA AND THEN

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R 091742Z DEC 76

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3984

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR S APE

CINC EUR VAIHINGEN

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY ROME

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CONTINUING WITH A FIRST -- IF ALSO UNDERSTANDABLY
MODEST -- LIMITATION OF NATIONAL FORCES IN THE SAME
AREA. ONE MUST FINALLY BEGIN EVEN IF THESE FIRST STEPS
CAN ONLY REALLY BE VERY MODEST.

QUESTION: WHAT INSTRUCTIONS WOULD YOU RECOMMEND TO
THE FRG FOR THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP CONFERENCE IN BELGRADE
THIS COMING SUMMER?

BRANDT: IN THE FIFTEEN MONTHS SINCE HELSINKI THERE
HAS UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN CERTAIN PROGRESS; FOR EXAMPLE,
IN THE GERMAN-POLISHRELATIONSHIP OR EVEN THE FINAL
SETTLEMENT OF ITALIAN-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS. INDEED, THERE
WERE ALSO REVERSES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE HARMFUL INCIDENTS
ONTHE BORDER BETWEEN THE TWO GERMAN STATES. ON THE
WHOLE THE FIRST INTERIM BALANCE IS NOT ESPECIALLY SATIS-
FACTORY. ONE WILL HAVE TO TALK ABOUT THIS IN BELGRADE.
BUT I WARN YOU THAT ONE SHOULD NOT GIVE FUTILE ACCUSA-
TORY SPEECHES THERE. ONE MUST DRAW THE INTERIM BALANCE
AND REVIEW WHAT CAN BE DRIVEN FORWARD QUICKER, BETTER
AND MORE CONSISTENTLY. GOVERNMENTS SHOULD ALSO ASSUME
THE OBLIGAION TO GIVE OUR PEOPLES REGULAR ACCOUNTS
ABOUT PROGRESS ON HELSINKI. ONE MUST ABOVE ALL ALWAYS
KEEP THE FUTURE IN MIND. IN THIS CONNECTION, FOR
EXAMPLE, I THINK ABOUT THE GREAT PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN
ENERGY POLICY OR ABOUT QUESTIONS OF TRANSPORTATION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, TO WHICH BREZHNEV HAS ALREADY
REFERRED. IT APPEARS TO ME NOT LESS IMPORTANT TO SPEAK
WITH THE WARSAW PACT STATES ABOUT HOW ONE CAN WORK
TOGETHER TO GIVE THE WORLD ECONOMY A STABILIZING IMPULSE,
AND TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH. THIS

IS A PROBLEM WHICH, IN THE LONG RUN, CONCERNS NOT ONLY
WESTERN BUT ALSO EASTERN INDUSTRIAL STATES.

QUESTION: YOU HAVE PERSONAL EXPERIENCE IN DEALING
WITH GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV. WHAT DO YOU EXPECT
FROM HIS VISIT NEXT SPRING?

BRANDT: I BELIEVE IT CAN BECOME A VERY IMPORTANT
VISIT. IT WOULD INDEED NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY
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BOTH SIDES SO SOON AFTER THE ELECTION. THERE IS, ON THE
ONE HAND, THE QUESTION OF WHICH FURTHER POSSIBILITIES
FOR DEVELOPMENT ARE TO BE FOUND IN THE ECONOMIC AREA,
A QUESTION ON WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE IS CERTAINLY VERY
INTERESTED AS ARE WE IN CERTAIN ASPECTS. A SPECTACULAR
BROADENING OF GERMAN-SOVIET TRADE IS PRESUMABLY NOT TO
BE EXPECTED. RATHER, IT CONCERNS INSURING ITS CONTIN-
UITY. THEREFORE, IT IS STILL MORE IMPORTANT TO KNOW
WHAT POLITICAL SUBSTANCE IS HIDDEN IN SUCH A VISIT.
ABOVE ALL, THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE CHANCELLOR AND
GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV CAN PLAY A GREAT ROLE: IN
THE APPROACHES TO THE FIRST CSCE FOLLOW-UP
CONFERENCE IN BELGRADE AS WELL AS FOR -- WHEN EVEN
RATHER MODEST -- FIRST STEPS IN THE AREA OF TROOP
REDUCTIONS. IT CAN ALSO CONTRIBUTE
TO ENCOURAGING THE SOVIET INTEREST IN COOPERATING ON
SOLUTIONS TO QUESTIONS OF COMPENSATION BETWEEN INDUS-
TRIAL, RAW MATERIAL, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

NATURALLY, IN ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS, IT DOES NOT
MEAN THE GERMANS WILL GO IT ALONE. THE CHANCELLOR HAS
ALREADY DECLARED THAT HE WILL CONSULT AT THE EARLIEST
POSSIBLE TIME WITH PRESIDENT CARTER AND WITH OTHER
CHIEFS OF GOVERNMENT. WE CAN DEAL WITH THESE QUESTIONS
ONLY TOGETHER WITH OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS AND OUR ALLIES
IN NATO. BUT WE CAN PERHAPS MAKE USE OF A PROBING
FUNCTION. IN ANY CASE, WE OURSELVES SHOULD NOT UNDER-
TAKE TOO MUCH, BUT WE SHOULD NOT MAKE OURSELVES OUT TO
BE SMALLER THAN WE ARE. END TEXT.

3. BERLIN. THE FACT THAT BONN AND MOSCOW HAVE BECOME
DISCUSSION PARTNERS THROUGH THE EASTERN TREATIES ALSO
FOR QUESTIONS AFFECTING BERLIN HAS NOT BEEN, ACCORDING
TO BRANDT, SUFFICIENTLY APPRECIATED AS A QUALITATIVE
CHANGE. THE SPD CHAIRMAN RECOMMENDED PUTTING ASIDE
INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING BERLIN, TAKING THEM
UP AGAIN ONLY AFTER AN EXAMINATION OF THE POSSIBLE
DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES WITHIN THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP.

4. NON-FIRST-USE. THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL TO CONCLUDE
A TREATY ON THE NON-FIRST-USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AMONG

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CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES DOES NOT LEAD VERY FAR,
ACCORDING TO BRANDT. IT IS NOT BALANCED WITHIN THE

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ACTION EUR-12

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3985

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

CINC EUR VAIHINGEN

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

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AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
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FRAMEWORK OF THE ENTIRE PACKAGE OF DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS

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PRESENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION.

5. CDU DEPUTY ALOIS MERTES CALLED AN EMBASSY OFFICER TODAY TO ADVISE THAT HE WAS ISSUING A PRESS STATEMENT CALLING THE BRANDT INTERVIEW "ACTIVE SABOTAGE" OF THE WESTERN MBFR POSITION. MERTES ALSO SAID HE HAD WRITTEN PREVIOUSLY TO THE CHANCELLOR ABOUT THE SPD POSITION ON MBFR BUT HAD NOT YET RECEIVED A REPLY.

6. COMMENTS: BRANDT'S LATEST REMARKS ABOUT MBFR REPRESENT A REAFFIRMATION OF THE SPD'S PUBLIC POSTURE THAT THE PARTY WANTS TO DO SOMETHING TO GET THE TROOP REDUCTION TALKS MOVING. WE BELIEVE BRANDT FEELS FRUSTRATED WITH THE LACK OF MOVEMENT IN THE FRG'S "OST-POLITIK" AND THAT THE MBFR TALKS OFFER A PRINCIPAL AREA WHERE EAST-WEST ACCOMMODATION, ALBEIT SYMBOLIC, WOULD, IN BRANDT'S VIEW, BE IN THE EUROPEANS' INTEREST.

THE QUESTION IS HOW THE GERMANS CAN RECONCILE THE TWO MBFR POLICY LINES NOW EMANATING FROM BONN (REFTEL). A FONOFF MBFR OFFICIAL HAS TOLD US THAT GENSCHER RECEIVED CONCURRENCE FROM SCHMIDT THAT HE, GENSCHER, WOULD REAFFIRM FRG ADHERENCE TO THE ALLIANCE POSITION OF PARITY AND THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING AT THE NATO MINISTERIAL. WHILE FONOFF OFFICIALS ARE POOH-POOING THE BRANDT INTERVIEW AS THE STATEMENT OF A POLITICIAN, THEY ARE NONETHELESS CONCERNED AND STUDYING IT CAREFULLY. WE IMAGINE THAT GENSCHER WILL NOT BE TOO HAPPY ABOUT THE INTERVIEW WHEN HE LEARNS OF IT IN BRUSSELS.

AS FOR CSCE, WE NOTE THAT BRANDT IS NOW ECHOING THE BREZHNEV THEME ABOUT ENERGY, TRANSPORTATION, AND THE ENVIRONMENT. THIS, TOO, IS NOT OFFICIAL FRG POLICY, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME IN THE FONOFF WHO BELIEVE THE SOVIET POSITION AS DEMANDEUR ON THIS PROPOSAL SHOULD BE

EXPLOITED IN THE WESTERN INTEREST.

BRANDT DECLINED TO GO INTO DETAIL ON BERLIN
QUESTIONS. HE RATHER CHOSE TO RELATE THE SOLUTION OF
INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS TO THE GENERAL STATE OF USSR/FRG
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RELATIONS, NOTING THAT PROGRESS IN THE LATTER CAN HAVE
A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON THE FORMER.

BRANDT DID NOT NEGLECT THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC
RELATIONS -- AND, SURPRISINGLY, NORTH/SOUTH
QUESTIONS -- AS AREAS OF DISCUSSION WITH BREZHNEV DURING
HIS VISIT. HIS REMARK ABOUT TRADE (CONTINUITY
IMPORTANT; DO NOT EXPECT SPECTACULAR DEVELOPMENTS) IS
CONSISTENT WITH SCHMIDT'S REPORTED INTEREST.

ON THE WHOLE, THE INTERVIEW WAS VINTAGE BRANDT:
STRONG ON THE BIG PICTURE, POSITIVE IN TONE TOWARD
SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS, INNOVATIVE PROPOSALS, UNCONCERNED
ON DETAILS AND ANALYSIS. IT REFLECTS CONTINUED
INTEREST IN EASTERN POLICY AND, PERHAPS, AN INTENTION
TO BECOME MORE ACTIVE IN THE FIELD IN COMING MONTHS.
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04 MAY 2006

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